November 17
Statement·Presser·Minutes
AGAlan GreenspanNovember 17, 1992 FOMC Record of Policy Actions
Vote
- Wayne D. Angell
- E. Gerald Corrigan
- Alan Greenspan
- Thomas M. Hoenig
- Jerry L. Jordan ↓ dissented
- Mr. Jordan dissented because he preferred taking immediate action to increase the availability of bank reserves sufficiently to raise M2 growth to a pace more consistent with the Committee's annual range. Because desirable M2 expansion in line with the Committee's objectives would be likely to fall within a lower range next year, he would announce concurrently a reduction in the 1993 range to make clear that near-term action to increase M2 expansion was not an abandonment of the long-term objective of non-inflationary monetary growth.
- Edward W. Kelley, Jr.
- John P. LaWare • dissented
- Messrs. LaWare and Melzer dissented because they did not want to bias the directive toward possible easing during the intermeeting period. In their view, recent developments pointed to a strengthening economy, and they favored a steady policy that was not predisposed to react to near-term weakness in economic or monetary data. More time was needed to evaluate the effects of prior monetary policy actions, and they were concerned that the adoption of a more stimulative policy over the near term might well-establish a basis for greater inflation later.
- Lawrence B. Lindsey
- Thomas C. Melzer ↑ dissented
- Messrs. LaWare and Melzer dissented because they did not want to bias the directive toward possible easing during the intermeeting period. In their view, recent developments pointed to a strengthening economy, and they favored a steady policy that was not predisposed to react to near-term weakness in economic or monetary data. More time was needed to evaluate the effects of prior monetary policy actions, and they were concerned that the adoption of a more stimulative policy over the near term might well-establish a basis for greater inflation later. Mr. Melzer was concerned that rapid growth in total bank reserves, the monetary base, and M1 over the last two years might already have laid a foundation for accelerating nominal GDP growth and a reversal of the disinflationary trend. In addition, he noted that policy errors can easily be made at this stage of the business cycle. In an economic expansion, efforts to resist increases in the federal funds rate through large reserve injections eventually lead to higher inflation and higher nominal interest rates.
- David W. Mullins, Jr.
- Susan M. Phillips
- Richard F. Syron
From the minutes
FOMC minutes
though without the strong presumption of some potential easing that had been associated with the previous directive. They observed that the economy was still expanding at a relatively subdued pace, inflation was on a downward track, and given the earlier tendency for the recovery to weaken, they believed that the Committee should react relatively promptly to indications, including any downturn in money growth, that the economy might again be falling short of a moderate growth path. Most of the members who preferred to ease immediately indicated that they could accept an unchanged directive that was biased towards ease, and such a directive also was acceptable to many members who favored a symmetrical directive. At the conclusion of the Committee's discussion, all but three of the members indicated their acceptance of a directive that called for maintaining the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions and that would include some bias toward possible easing during the intermeeting period. Two of the members expressed a strong preference for a symmetric directive with regard to possible intermeeting policy adjustments, while another was firmly persuaded of the desirability of an immediate increase in reserve availability to strengthen the growth of M2. Accordingly, in the context of the Committee's long-run objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and giving careful consideration to economic, financial, and monetary developments, the Committee decided that slightly greater monetary restraint might be acceptable or slightly lesser monetary restraint would be acceptable during the intermeeting period. The reserve conditions contemplated at this meeting were expected to be consistent with growth in M2 and M3 at annual rates of about 3-1/2 and 1 percent respectively over the three-month period from September through December.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the following domestic policy directive was issued to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: The information reviewed at this meeting suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Total nonfarm payroll employment was up slightly in October after declining in the previous two months, and the civilian unemployment rate edged down to 7.4 percent. Industrial production rose somewhat in October. Retail sales increased considerably in September and October. There was some strengthening in residential construction activity over the summer months. Outlays for business equipment have continued to increase, and recent data on orders for nondefense capital goods point to further growth in the near term; expenditures for nonresidential construction have remained weak. The nominal U.S. merchandise trade deficit widened somewhat in July-August from its average rate in the second quarter. Recent data on wages and prices have been mixed but suggest on balance a continuing trend toward lower inflation. Most interest rates have increased appreciably since the Committee meeting on October 6. In foreign exchange markets, the trade-weighted value of the dollar in terms of the other G-10 currencies rose very substantially over the intermeeting period. M2 has expanded at a moderate pace since midsummer, with all of its growth stemming from its Ml component, while M3 grew slowly. Through October, both aggregates were estimated to have grown at rates a little below the lower ends of the ranges established by the Committee for the year. The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial conditions that will foster price stability and promote sustainable growth in output. In furtherance of these objectives, the Committee at its meeting on June 30-July 1 reaffirmed the ranges it had established in February for growth of M2 and M3 of 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent and 1 to 5 percent respectively, measured from the fourth quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 1992. The Committee anticipated that developments contributing to unusual velocity increases could persist in the second half of the year. The monitoring range for growth of total domestic nonfinancial debt also was maintained at 4-1/2 to 8-1/2 percent for the year. For 1993, the Committee on a tentative basis set the same ranges as in 1992 for growth of the monetary aggregates and debt, measured from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 1993. The behavior of the monetary aggregates will continue to be evaluated in the light of progress toward price level stability, movements in their velocities, and developments in the economy and financial markets.
In the implementation of policy for the immediate future, the Committee seeks to maintain the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions. In the context of the Committee's long-run objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and giving careful consideration to economic, financial, and monetary developments, slightly greater reserve restraint might or slightly lesser reserve restraint would be acceptable in the intermeeting period. The contemplated reserve conditions are expected to be consistent with growth of M2 and M3 over the period from September through December at annual rates of about 3-1/2 and 1 percent, respectively. Votes for this action: Messrs. Greenspan, Corrigan, Angell, Hoenig, Kelley, Lindsey, Mullins, Ms. Phillips, and Mr. Syron. Votes against this action: Messrs. Jordan, LaWare, and Melzer. Mr. Jordan dissented because he preferred taking immediate action to increase the availability of bank reserves sufficiently to raise M2 growth to a pace more consistent with the Committee's annual range. Because desirable M2 expansion in line with the Committee's objectives would be likely to fall within a lower range next year, he would announce concurrently a reduction in the 1993 range to make clear that near-term action to increase M2 expansion was not an abandonment of the long-term objective of non-inflationary monetary growth. Messrs. LaWare and Melzer dissented because they did not want to bias the directive toward possible easing during the intermeeting period. In their view, recent developments pointed to a strengthening economy, and they favored a steady policy that was not predisposed to react to near-term weakness in economic or monetary data. More time was needed to evaluate the effects of prior monetary policy actions, and they were concerned that the adoption of a more stimulative policy over the near term might well-establish a basis for greater inflation later. Mr. Melzer was concerned that rapid growth in total bank reserves, the monetary base, and M1 over the last two years might already have laid a foundation for accelerating nominal GDP growth and a reversal of the
disinflationary trend. In addition, he noted that policy errors can easily be made at this stage of the business cycle. In an economic expansion, efforts to resist increases in the federal funds rate through large reserve injections eventually lead to higher inflation and higher nominal interest rates. 2. Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations The Committee approved a temporary increase of $3 billion, to a level of $11 billion, in the limit on changes between Committee meetings in System Account holdings of U.S. government and federal agency securities. The increase amended paragraph l(a) of the Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations and was effective for the intermeeting period ending with the close of business on December 22, 1992. Votes for this action: Messrs. Greenspan, Corrigan, Angell, Hoenig, Jordan, Kelley, LaWare, Lindsey, Melzer, Mullins, Ms. Phillips, and Mr. Syron. Votes against this action: None. The Manager of the System Open Market Account advised the Committee that the current leeway of $8 billion for changes in System Account holdings might not be sufficient to accommodate the potentially large need to add reserves over the intermeeting period ahead to meet an anticipated seasonal bulge in the demand for currency and required reserves.
What changed from the previous meeting’s minutes
- The FOMC's directive bias shifted from a strong presumption toward easing to a weaker bias toward possible easing.
- The FOMC's projected M2 growth for September through December rose from about 2 percent to about 3-1/2 percent.
- The FOMC's vote count changed from 8 for and 4 against to 9 for and 3 against.
- The FOMC approved a temporary $3 billion increase in the limit on System Account holdings, to $11 billion.
- The FOMC's directive no longer included language about a "marked bias" toward easing, instead citing a "some bias."
Summary generated automatically from the two documents.
Also: Minutes of Actions