December 19
Statement·Presser·Minutes
WMWm. McC. Martin, JrDecember 19, 1961 FOMC Minutes
Vote
- C. Canby Balderston
- W. D. Fulton
- Alfred Hayes
- Watrous H. Irons
- G.H. King, Jr. ↓ dissented
- His dissent was largely on the basis that he thought this was the wrong time for any trend in the direction of less ease. In his opinion it would be wiser to wait until after the Holiday shopping period was out of the way. He felt, however, that a month or a month and a half from now he would be likely to come to the same conclusion as the majority of the Committee.
- Wm. McC. Martin
- A.L. Mills, Jr. ↑ dissented
- He had dissented because the policy would not be as strongly restraining as he believed conditions required. He added that at every juncture where there had been some tendency toward even a modest tightening, that tightening had not occurred; at the first shadow of any market disturbance, the Committee had turned and moved in the other direction.
- George W. Mitchell ↓ dissented
- His dissent was on the ground that he did not think this was the right time to start tightening.
- J.L. Robertson • dissented
- He opposed the implementation of policy according to the consensus on the basis that he did not believe in tying monetary policy to the bill rate.
- Chas. N. Shepardson
- Swan
- Wayne
From the minutes
FOMC minutes
then said that he was in favor of moving ahead and Mr. Mitchell matter should be pushed forward as hard and as fast as that he felt the possible. Mr. Fulton stated that he would be in favor of proceeding in accordance with the suggestion in the Secretary's letter. He would see the System get into an operation of this kind before the dislike to Congress had unequivocally given the System the authority and had expressed the opinion that the Federal Reserve was the agency to do the job. Exploration with the Treasury seemed to him highly desirable, with a view to seeking legislaticn on a unified basis. Mr. Bopp expressed agreement with the comments made by Mr. Fulton. said that he would like to see two steps taken Mr. Balderston concurrently. The first would be consultation between the legal staffs of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, as suggested in the letter from the Secretary of the Treasury. The second would be the development of guidelines in this area that would correspond to the continuing authority directive in the domes,.:c area. Then, as soon as Congress gave the green light, the System would be in a position to begin operations in foreign currencies without further discussion and delay. Mr. Balderston also referred to the point, previously mentioned, that the System might be ineffectual in meeting a crisis if it waited until the crisis actually occurred. For this reason he felt that, as a precautionary measure, action should be taken promotly to acquire currencies
of key countries. At various times of the year such currencies could be obtained advantageously despite the fact that this country was now in a deficit situation. Mr. Balderston commented that the aggregate of dollars spent in the acquisition of foreign currencies would be small relative to the amounts placed in foreign hands in the form of investing and spending abroad. Protective steps should be taken before a crisis occurred, as illustrated by this year's experience of the United Kingdom. Had sterling been bought for the Federal Reserve System's portfolio when it was low in price last spring, perhaps it would not have been necessary for the United States to sell the United Kingdom $300 million of gold in November. Chairman Martin stated that on the basis of the comments that had been made, it appeared that the sentiment favored going forward with the proposal by autnorizing consultation with the legal staff of the Treasury, as suggested in the Secretary's letter. After referring to the point that had been raised about initiating foreign currency operations in advance of a crisis, the Chairman indicated that he would like to clarify his own position. He thought that the proposed operations in foreign currencies would be a very desirable activity. He also thought, however, that the System ought to be very careful about giving the idea that these operations were going to solve fundamental problems. It should be recognized, for example, that if the Federal Reserve had held $300
million of sterling the British might have taken the gold anyhow. Further, the British might not have taken the steps toward a solution of their payments problem that they took in the interim. No one could know such things for certain. In any event, however, either in the Government securities market or in the foreign exchange market, it was still necessary to deal with fundamentals. One must not be misled into thinking that any of these ideas, good as they were, were going to solve the whole problem. The problem was not that simple. On the other hand, every practical device should be used. With reference to Mr. Balderston's comment about the need for working out a directive for foreign currency operations similar to the continuing authority directive in the domestic area, Mr. Hayes said he felt that this had largely been done. The Secretary of the Committee had been working along tnose lines for some time. The only point he would like to add to the discussion was that he thought the Treasury should review carefully the documentation concerning the details of the proposed operations to see whether it saw anything wrong. The advice of the Treasury on the technical aspects of the proposal should be obtained. Chairman Martin said he understood from today's discussion that Counsel would be authorized to refer any of the documentation to the Treasury for review. He agreed that the staff had done a good job in putting this material together. Further, there had been excellent cooperation on the part of the Treasury. It was only at the December 5
Committee meeting that he was authorized to discuss the subject with the Treasury, and the letter since received from the Secretary was in his opinion a good letter. It provided a satisfactory basis on which to proceed without impairment of the position of either the Treasury or the Federal Reserve. No disagreement with the comments of Chairman Martin was indicated. At the conclusion of the discussion, the legal staff of the Committee was authorized to confer with the legal staff of the Treasury for the purposes suggested in the letter from the Secretary of the T reasury. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Open Market Committee ,ould be held on Tuesday, January 9, 1962. The meeting then adjourned. Secretary
What changed from the previous meeting’s minutes
- The Committee authorized its legal staff to confer with Treasury legal staff, moving from discussion to formal authorization.
- The proposal to establish a subcommittee to oversee foreign currency operations was eliminated from the revised draft papers.
- The revised guidelines removed reference to offsetting seasonal and cyclical swings, limiting operations to unusual payments swings.
- Chairman Martin clarified he favored exploring Treasury consultation before starting operations, rather than proceeding immediately.
- Members expressed preference for obtaining statutory clarification from Congress prior to initiating foreign currency operations.
- The revised papers added a sentence stating operations should not be used to obscure basic changes in the U.S. balance of payments.
Summary generated automatically from the two documents.
Also: Record of Policy Actions